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RELIGION AS OBJECT AND THE
GRAMMAR OF LAW
LARRY CATA BACKER*
It is a commonplace notion that Religion' has been disestablished as
a formal matter in the United States We also understand that our legal
culture has extended the reach of this formal disestablishment well
beyond that minimally required under the Federal Constitution. What
Steven Smith suggests in his thoughtful article is that this well-known
phenomenon of de facto disestablishment is far more pervasive and
influential than we might suspect. "[I]t powerfully influences legal
thinking-and thus judicial decision making-in a variety of ways and
on a whole range of issues, many of which hardly anyone thinks of as
religion clause issues at all.
'
,
4
The result of this disestablishment is a deep and enduring
deprivileging of Religion as a normative basis for decision making.
Religion is relegated to object. As such, it is inconceivable to think of
Religion as part of the grammar of law. "If an unspoken and irregular
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
Professor of Law & Co-Director, Comparative and International Law Center, University of
Tulsa College of Law. This paper is based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Religion
and the Judicial Process: Legal, Ethical and Empirical Dimensions, at Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (April 4-5, 1997). The author wishes to thank Professor
Scott Idleman for organizing a stimulating conference.
1. As I explain more fully in part II, infra, I distinguish here between Religion and
religion. Religion connotes communities bound by fully formed formal integrated belief
systems. Such systems may include more or less fully formed codes of everyday conduct
derived from the tenets of the community's beliefs. This is what we normally think of when
we hear the words Catholic, Methodist, Muslim, or Jew. The other-religion-is the more
amorphous; it implies systems of religious sentiment which can be personal or collective, free-
floating or coercive, open or exclusive. The former is a subset of the latter. All Religion can
be deemed to be expressions of personal religious sensibilities. But amorphous religious
sensibilities do not necessarily constitute Religion.
2. Formal disestablishment was enacted as a constitutional limitation on the federal
government through the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This disestablishment
was extended to the states, according to the courts at least, through the Fourteenth
Amendment U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. See the articles cited in Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto
Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 203, n.1 (1998) [hereinafter, Smith, De Facto
Disestablishment].
4. Il at 204.
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but nonetheless powerful prohibition excluding religion from public and
especially legal discourse has been in effect for some time, then those of
us who are interested in 'law and religion' need to pay attention to that
phenomenon."5
The deprivileging of Religion is at its most acute in what is described
as the "fourth zone" of disestablishment. This is the zone of non-
constitutional judicial, and I would add, legislative, decision-making.
"[I]n the fourth zone it seems that the de facto disestablishment
combines with a kind of residual legal positivism to produce a relatively
strong restriction on the invocation of religion by judges., 7 Professor
Smith uses the example of the measure of damages to show how
American hyper-disestablishment obliterates the measure of the psychic
benefit of injury because of its quasi-religious connections. "Damages
calculations do not offset lost salary, or compensation for pain and
suffering with any credit for enriched insight, or enhanced self-
understanding, or chance for reflection on the purpose of life, or the
possible recovery of one's soul."8 The only reason for this omission is
the "religious" character of that enterprise.9 As such, a potentially
useful approach to the law of damages is "sacrificed" on the alter of
disestablishment.
Professor Smith does not set out to judge the value of this state of
affairs. However, by the end of Professor Smith's investigation, I was
left with the clear sense that some sort of conscious reconciling of
religion and the process of law is necessary to alleviate the tensions
inherent in the current state of affairs. Professor Smith here speaks of
the de facto disestablishment's "troubling consequence: It deprives legal
discourse of the counsel of our deepest convictions and reflections, and
thereby renders our discussions superficial and obtuse.""
Ahhh, religion! In this paper, I wish to address three points raised
5. Id. at 227.
6. Id. at 211.
7. Id. at 217.
8. Id. at 223.
9. Professor Smith considers and rejects several arguments against the quantification of
this "vertical element" of damages: (i) that the vertical element of damages is not realistically
quantifiable, and (ii) the current civil approach is the only practical approach to measuring
damages. Id. at 224-26.
10. Professor Smith begins his essay by acknowledging that that judges, citizens and
legislators rely "upon their religious convictions in making political decisions." Id. at 203.
However, he does not "intend to enter into the merits of that debate here, or to question
whether that debate as typically framed is a meaningful one." id.
11. Id. at 227.
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or implied with respect to the notion of the objectification of Religion.
First, I suggest that the American approach to Religion is not haphazard
or serendipitous, nor is it accidental. Rather, de facto disestablishment
reflects a basic normative choice made at the time of the founding of our
Republic. The discursive quality of the Establishment Clause itself
serves to compel treatment of Religion primarily as an object of law.
That we understand that religion is something that is acted on can be
readily seen in the Supreme Court's recent City of Boerne v. Flores
decision,12 as well as in the recent attempts to constitutionalize
institutionalized prayer in public places.13
Second, many of the efforts of late twentieth century American
commentators have moved away from a conceptualization of Religion
as an object of law. In its place, we seek to substitute a
conceptualization of Religion as part of the grammar of law. However,
when we seek to stretch the utility of Religion-that is, when we
attempt to make Religion serve as part of our grammar of law-we
cheat. We do this by pretending that we do not speak of traditional
Religion at all. Instead, we hide Religion behind the cloak of any one of
an infinite number of amorphous personal belief systems. Yet, to
engage in that enterprise is to belittle the normative significance of
Religion as independent imperial systems of law.
Third, even assuming that society is inclined to permit the inclusion
of Religion into the grammar of law (its process), we must be willing to
sanitize Religion of both its context and its history. To accomplish this
task, we must induce a national cultural amnesia. Yet it seems to me
most odd in this day of cultural and historical reawakening that we
engage in a project of official "forgetting." Those who bear the effects
of history and context find it harder to forget. Those whose Religion is
built upon such history and context, especially in relation to other
Religions, cannot but continue to behave in accordance with those
dictates, even under the guise of "individual subjective belief."
Finally, if we must insist on incorporating Religion into the grammar
of law, we must be prepared for the consequences. I will speak here
12. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
13. I refer here, of course, to the constitutional amendment concerning public prayer
which is championed this time around by Rep. Istook (R-Okla.). The amendment provides
that: "To secure the people's right to acknowledge God: The right to pray or acknowledge
religious belief, heritage or tradition on public property, including public schools, shall not be
infringed. The Government shall not compel joining in prayer, initiate or compose school
prayers, discriminate against or deny a benefit on account of religion." Katharine Q. Seelye,
Lawmaker Proposes New Prayer Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, March 25,1997, at A20.
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briefly to what I consider the most important negative ramification of
such a course. We must be prepared for the possibility that such an
enterprise will endanger that other great cultural project of this
Nation-the project of assimilation. While less appreciated today than
in earlier times, 4 the project of assimilation defined our character as a
nation. Its abandonment can only be accelerated by the rush to
incorporate Religion into the grammar of law.5 As such, I would argue,
to paraphrase the language of Steve Smith, that "those of us who are
interested in 'law and [society]' need to pay attention to that
phenomenon."16
I. RELIGION AS AN OBJECr OF LAW IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Steven Smith suggested, in an earlier work, that "[e]ven when it does
not dictate the results in particular cases, legal doctrine has the power to
orient and direct the kind of discourse in which those cases are debated
14. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now 96 (1997)
("Indeed, in recent years it has been taken for granted that assimilation-as an expectation of
how different ethnic and racial groups would respond to their common presence in one
society, or as an ideal of how the society should evolve, or as the expected result of a sober
social scientific analysis of the ultimate consequence of the meeting of people and races-is to
be rejected".) This dislike of assimilation is, I would argue, a matter of aesthetics, an
affectation that hides the reality behind the dislike. That reality is one in which control of the
machinery of assimilation is contested among several groups. The use of the language of
dislike shrouds this battle and is meant to prevent any of the contestants from usurping the
machinery completely prior to the end of the contest. See Larry Cati Backer, Essay: Poor
Relief, Welfare Paralysis and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1, 34-46.
15. This is not to say that Religion will be the cause of the demise of assimilation.
Rather, it forms part of that assault on the assimilative model which had dominated
American thought through the end of the Second World War. Leading that assault, of
course, has been what has been described as "multiculturalism." In its guise as political
diversity, its champions have sought quite openly to force the abandonment of all assimilative
notions, and substitute any one of a number of other bases for union within one nation-state.
See, e.g., PETER D. SALINS, ASSIMILATION, AMERICAN STYLE 95-99 (1997); GLAZER, supra
note 14, at 1-21, 57-78. Cf. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can
Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1929, 1958-1960 (1991) (arguing that the
incorporation of diverse ideas and perspectives in the judicial process may prevent judges
from making morally erroneous decisions because it allows judges to better understand the
diverse body of litigants). Incorporation of Religion into the grammar of law might at first
blush be seen as an effort, on the part of traditionalists, to counter this anti-assimilationist
thrust. It is sometimes marketed under that banner. See generally, ROBE"RT H. BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND THE AMERICAN
DECLINE (1996). However, it is better understood as a traditionalist version of anti-
assimilation by reinstitutionalizing, as political, those cultural bases of governance and norm
setting which predated the loss of hegemony by American Protestants, at least among the
political elites. See discussion, infra part I.
16. Smith, De Facto Disestablishment, supra note 3, at 227.
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and decided .... [It can] powerfully influence the way in which the
debate is framed."17 I believe that the federal Constitution itself serves
this discursive purpose. It has a strong discourse-orienting power which
has crafted the framework within which we Americans have bound
ourselves to think about Religion. With respect to Religion, the Federal
Constitution has oriented Religion as a noun within the grammar of the
law.
This orientating power is especially apparent in the Religion
Clauses. 18 The Religion Clauses orient Religion as an object of law.
Those provisions gather up Religion as a bundle of issues involving
worship by or through the state, and treats this bundle as a tangible res. 9
Religion, as a body corporate, is separable and distinct from law.
Indeed, as Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia clearly illustrate in their
dueling opinions in City of Boerne,2 the colonial lawmakers, as well as
the Founders, were concerned with Religion (as a formally constituted
res) only as an object upon which law might act. 1 Even in an age of
great deference to Religion in all aspects of life, the American approach
appeared to be "that the appropriate response to conflicts between the
civil law and religious scruples was, where possible, accommodation of
religious conduct.''2 Accommodation is a curious word-one which
does not suggest the incorporation of Religion in the process of
everyday law making.
Indeed, this discursive quality of the Religion Clauses themselves
follows the pattern laid down by our English progenitors as they
struggled to effect religious peace in the Realm after almost two
centuries of strife. In a society in which Christian principles as the moral
philosophical substructure of law was unquestioned, Religion became
noteworthy only in the guise of practices. One need look little further
than John Locke for an understanding of the basis of which our
constitutional discourse is framed (that is, bounded, and thus bounded,
limited).2
17. Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 519,526 (1994) [hereinafter, Smith, Discourse of Disrespect].
18. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
19. I would argue that the manifestations of Religion are tangible, and that the law is
concerned with those manifestations.
20. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
21. See id. at 2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring) and 2176-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
22- Id. at 2183 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
1998]
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Yet, we must understand that Religion was treated as res not
because of a desire to disestablish "religious principles." Rather the
reason implied quite the opposite rationale. Religion could be treated
as res in a society in which Christian principles were firmly and
unconsciously entrenched in the interstices of everyday law making.2 '
Religious disestablishment of the kind described by Professor Smith
becomes noteworthy only because civil decision making has strayed
from the traditional religious principles which underlay law making
through the end of the Second World War. Only in an America in
which the normative substructure of systems of civil law have strayed
from those of the systems of the old dominant religious discourse, could
disestablishment at the level of mundane law making become visible.
"Consensual pluralism at mid-century had been marked by a simply
envisioned matrix of religious groups. Succeeding and replacing this
was a more complex but still informal polity, one that did not focus on
religious groups. ' In the sections that follow, I attempt a exhibition of
this Religious substructural complacency in law.26
Because the religious principles of Christianity were so normatively
ingrained in American law making, Religion could be treated as little
different, conceptually, from objects like, for example, "corporations."
Each such object is an intangible with tangible manifestations. Each is
regulable to some extent. Thus, we have agreed for the moment that
American state governments may regulate the "internal affairs"' of
WESTERN WORLD 1 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc. 1952).
24. See infra part III.
25. MARTIN E. MARTY, THE ONE AND THE MANY: AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE
COMMON GOOD 101 (1997).
26. See infra part IV.
27. "Internal affairs" is generally defined as "relations inter se of the corporation, its
shareholders, directors, officers, or agents." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 313 cmt. a (1971). "The regulation of the internal affairs of American business
corporations and, thus, corporate governance, has largely and traditionally been a function of
state law. A widely recognized conflict of laws principle establishes that the law of the
corporation's state of incorporation is the governing law for that corporation." Mark J.
Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance 41 ALA. L. REV. 783 786-87
(1994). See also Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987), RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971) (providing a list of internal corporate affairs). The
internal affairs principle has real application in the way in which we conceive of the
intersection of "law" and "religion."
It may be appealing to characterize modern lawyers as priests in disguise, but such
characterization would not change the fact that the secularization of the law was
completed in England by the fifteenth century when Common Lawyers took charge
of the Chancery. On the Continent, the clergy, which was strongly represented in
[Vol. 81:229
RELIGION AND THE GRAMMAR OF LAW
these intangible bodies corporate. Yet corporations remain free to
order themselves within the limits of the regulations and in return are
protected by the states. Analogously, Religion is also loosely regulable
with respect to its tenets (polygamy, sacrifice, and the like) and
operations (tax status), and is in turn protected by the state. The
converse, however, would prove to be an unruly means of informing the
way in which law (other than the law of their internal governance) is
made. Indeed, such an application of ethos could be deemed "out of
bounds" for the very reason that it would suggest the imposition of alien
norms, that is, the internal governance principles of one or more of our
religious "corporations," on a group (the "nation") which has
negotiated another set of standards for governing conduct. These
standards, of course, require sensitivity to the issue of "pari-corporate"
significance.
This is perhaps the intuitive understanding of writers such as Scott
Idleman and judges like Raul Gonzalez. Each considers the use of
"religion" as something important for the process of law making. But
each reserves this active use of "religion" to shape law making for the
exceptional case.' In a sense, they seem to suggest that Religion
remains an object unless a matter directly impacts on an area of direct
concern to the ability of Religion to conduct its "internal affairs."
Consequently, for Religion to form part of the discursive paradigm
of law while at the same time existing as the object of that paradigm,
would appear inconsistent with the discourse of our basic law. Indeed,
the recently decided City of Boerne case demonstrates the power of this
discursive model.'9 In a case in which the extent of the enforcement
power of the Fourteenth Amendment was ostensibly the issue, religion
was treated as the object of the regulatory power of the legislature. May
the parliaments until the French Revolution, has also been finally excluded from the
legal process. Consequently the legal profession (attorneys, judges, law professors)
is clearly distinct from the priesthood in the Western legal tradition of today.
Roughly speaking, the relationships between individuals, organizations or
institutions in society are the province of the lawyers. The relationship between the
individual and his or her internal conscience and/or between the individual and the
transcendental or the supernatural mysteries may be considered the province of the
priests.
Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 5,35-36 (1997).
28. See Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision
Making, 68 IND. LJ. 433, 434 (1993); Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder of Success-My
Spiritual Journey, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1996). Both are cited by Professor
Smith. See Smith, De Facto Disestablishment, supra note 3, at 215.
29. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
1998]
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the legislature incidentally burden "religion, ' 3° and may the legislature
permit "religion" to burden "legislation" within the federal system?
31
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 32 appears to
mandate the use of Religion in the grammar of law in a limited range of
legislative activity-when legislation might burden an individual's
"exercise" of "religion." A majority of the Court substantially agreed
that the intrusion of Religion into the grammar of law-even in this area
of most direct affect on and concern to Religion-was beyond the power
given the Congress under the Federal Constitution, even as amended by
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, Justice Stevens
was concerned that the RFRA amounted to a preference for "religion"
over "irreligion" and as such, established religion in violation of the
First Amendment.33 For Justice Scalia, who concurred in part of the
Court's decision, and Justice O'Connor, who dissented, the issue was the
means by which and the limitations on the power of the state to
affirmatively or incidentally burden the "right to participate in religious
practices and conduct."'
If this discursive power emanates from our basic law, then it follows
that anti-establishment of the kind Professor Smith describes should not
seem problematic. Indeed, Professor Smith himself demonstrates the
strength of this choice to objectify Religion through his description of
the way in which objectification has affected the curricular structure of
legal education almost from its inception. "But the important point is
that even when religion is considered, it typically appears more as a
specialty item or a distinctive type of problem, not as a valuable way of
thinking about law and legal issues generally."3 Thus understood, we
did not blunder into the anti-establishmentarianism of that area of the
law described by Professor Smith as the Fourth Zone of
disestablishment.36 To have Religion work as a verb within the grammar
of law would require a sharp departure from our discursive orientation
of constitutional theory, which may, at some point subvert the
framework within which we interpret our basic law.
Consequently, the failure to recognize the discursive quality of our
30. Id. at 2168-71.
31. Id. at 2169-72.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (1994).
33. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
34. Id. at 2177 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. Smith, De Facto Disestablishment, supra note 3, at 212.
36. See supra notes 6-9.
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Constitution, and the limits this quality suggests, especially in the guise
of the Religion Clauses, may lead one to overstate the importance or
nature of the lack of Religion as a discursive element of law making.
We accepted the necessary repercussions of characterizing Religion as
object with the crafting of the federal Constitution. Such a
characterization was no accident; and neither is the resulting
disestablishment at the level of the prosaic. Any change of this state of
affairs may well require deliberate and constitutional re-making. Still,
Professor Smith's unveiling of disestablishment at the level of mundane
law making is all the more striking for exposing the twentieth century
American revolution in normative consensus for law making. Our
approach to Religion has not changed. What has changed is the
normative substructure on which the decision to objectify Religion was
made. Law making based on a Judeo-Christian normative substructure
can no longer be taken for granted. As such, Professor Smith clearly
illustrates how this cultural transformation of (ir)religious normativity
may impact on the way those with religious sensibilities must approach
law making. What makes this difficult is not the place of Religion in
law, but the ways in which challenges to the normative Supremacy of
Protestant Christianity may require us to abandon ways of thinking
about law which were commonplace and deeply held since the time of
the colonization.
II. THE FAILURE OF RELIGION AS PART OF THE GRAMMAR OF LAW
I have suggested that when we attempt to treat Religion within law
as something other than an object of regulation, we "go against the
grain" of the discursive scheme of the federal Constitution. In this
section, I submit that when we seek to stretch the utility of Religion,
that is, when we attempt to make Religion serve as part of the grammar
of law, we must invariably fail... unless we cheat. To cheat is to equate
private subjective religious sensibilities with Religion, and to confer on
the comprehensive and exclusive systems of Religion the same benign
indulgence that we would accord these private subjective sensibilities.
The result is an intolerable state of affairs in which incompatible systems
battle using as "fronts" the personal subjective "religious" and "civil"
sensibilities of individual proxies. Our civil law began as an aping of
religious law; it incorporated the basic postulates of religious law. To
the extent that we have begun to reject that model (as some have begun
to reject the dominance of Christian moral philosophy as the root of law
in this century), religious sensibilities may of necessity offer not merely
a different approach to law making, but an incompatible one.
1998]
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Religion comprises wholly developed systems of laws, as
comprehensive as anything devised by the secular state. It is not for
nothing that Professor Smith notes in passing that a discussion of the
effect of religion on fourth zone (everyday common law issues) would
necessarily have to "compare secular contract, tort and property law
with Catholic, Protestant, Mormon, Jewish and Muslim versions of the
same subject."3 7 Religion as legal codex and jurisprudence demands an
exclusive allegiance every bit as jealous as that traditionally required by
the state in civil matters. To merge such systems requires the
disappearance of one in favor of the other.
We have become quite adept at substituting this notion of religious
sensibilities, and politically expedient religious moral philosophy, for
what used to pass for Religion. We have the temerity to do this in the
name of Religion. Yet to do this is to pretend that Religion does not
exist, at least in the sense commonly understood at the beginning of the
Republic. Yet we know that this complete system of law-Religion-
does exist. Still, we engage in this strange enterprise. Increasingly we
have chosen to substitute this thing I will call religion (with a lowercase)
for Religion when describing the relationship of "Religion" to civil
"legal culture." This (lowercase) religion posits personal belief systems
for the organized jurisprudence of what now might be more narrowly
described as "organized" Religion.
But such recasting ignores the traditional normative significance of
Religions in their own right as independent, fully-formed systems of law.
Any such Religion does not blend into our law, it tends to supplant or
retreat. And the problem is not ameliorated because the "results"
under each may be similar. Religion has become "object" in our system
to avoid such "conflict of laws" problems. Early in our history, we chose
to avoid having to engage in the political battles implied by any
necessity of "compar[ing] secular contract, tort, and property law with
Catholic, Protestant, Mormon, Jewish and Muslim versions of the same
subject"' and choosing a "winner" from inconsistent approaches.
Consequently, treating "Religion" as "religion" in order to provide a
place for it within the grammar of law merely finesses the problem
without confronting it. Such an approach can do little but create
37. Smith, De Facto Disestablishment, supra note 3, at 218.
38. Id. at 218. Of course, our Founders would have had little difficulty making this
choice because the competition then was between variants of what we now consider
mainstream Christian sects. But today the stakes are higher since the religious and secular
competitors have become so diverse.
[Vol. 81:229
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another site for potentially irresolvable conflict.
Thus, even as he acknowledges the complete and competing legal
systems of Religion, Professor Smith defines religion somewhat loosely.
"What we call religion typically amounts to a comprehensive way of
perceiving and understanding life and the world; it affects everything."39
Religion becomes a benign, individualized, subjective spiritualism. In
this form it is made more palatable as an active element of our legal
grammar. This modem view has become increasingly accepted in the
West. For example, Professor Winnifred Fallers Sullivan suggests that
we pay more attention to the idea of religion as a sort of varied and
shifting phenomenon. We must discard the tendency to objectively
classify and adopt a subjective view of belief.' Wrapped in the veil of
subjectivity, we can more palatably embrace individual belief as
spiritualism and spiritualism as Religion. My personal belief ought to be
accorded the same dignity and likened to the equivalent of, say, Islam,
Judaism, or Catholicism. Under this view, my moral philosophy ought
to be accorded the same weight as the Shari'a, the Canon Law, or the
Talmud. And all of this I ought to bring to my construction of the civil
law, especially with respect to the way in which the civil law embraces
you. I believe that this notion of subjectivity as the basis of
acknowledging "religious" belief is fundamentally right, as a matter of
anthropology, and certainly as a matter of faith (perhaps understood as
39. Id. at 216.
40. Professor Sullivan describes the way in which academics have deconstructed the
notion of "religion" in recent years. See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81
MARQ. L. REv. 441, 443 (1998). A central problem has centered on the indeterminacy of the
concept of religion. We cannot seem to agree on a formula for "knowing religion when we
see it." The problem has been described as originating from the necessity of creating a
definition useful in a world in which religious diaspora exist everywhere and where the old
Religious definitions of "religion" have ceased to be definitive. Id. The two basic methods
take very different approaches. The objective approach looks to group norms to "find"
religion. Id at 446-47. Religion is encountered as a community. Evidence of Religion centers
on community-written doctrine or oral tradition, systems of rules or codes of behavior,
mechanisms for policing conformity to community norms and the like. Id at 447-48. The
object is to make a determination that a requisite level of shared norms and beliefs exist so
that, as an "objective" matter, that it would be possible to say that a multi-generational
community of believers exist. Id. The subjective approach concentrates on the individual.
Religion is not equated with community; religion is a function of evidence of the existence of
some threshold set of coherent personal spiritual beliefs. Id at 447-49. The notion of the
indeterminacy of religion is one of long standing in legal academia. See, e.g., Jonathan Weiss,
Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964)
(arguing that even defining religion might violate the First Amendment). See generally Jesse
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (advocating a
definition of religion that is specific enough to allow courts to draw reasonable lines between
religion and non-religious belief systems).
1998]
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the Calvinists would have us understand the concept).4 As a matter of
the historical experience of America, however, such a definition may
prove more dangerous than useful. It will serve as a cloaking devise-to
raise personal belief to a dizzying dignity while hiding the way in which
the "personal" religious "sensibilities" of adherents of Religions with
powerful and well-developed traditions of "law" actually exalt
assimilation of the norms of the more influential of these communities.
Think of it at the level of the mundane. When you speak as an
individual, do I hear the collective voices of the group of which you are
a member? I suspect that most of us will hear you as an individual and
then weigh the value of your sentiments by the strength of the
conformity of that view to those officially professed by the Religion to
which you belong. In the ears of one's audience there may be no such
thing as individual voices.
Ironically, what this new "subjective" theoretics of the sociology of
religion calls to mind is not so much late twentieth-century pluralism but
third-century Imperial Roman spiritual anomie.42 We now seethe with
41. On faith, see, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, 542-92
(1559) (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westminster Press 1960). "[W]e hold
faith to be a knowledge of God's will toward us, perceived from his Word." Id. at 549. "For,
as faith is not content with a doubtful and changeable opinion, so it is not content with an
obscure and confused conception; but requires full and fixed certainty, such as men are wont
to have from things experienced and proved." Id at 560. "Here, indeed, is the chief hinge on
which faith turns: that we do not regard the promises of mercy that God offers as true only
outside ourselves, but not at all in us; rather that we make them ours by inwardly embracing
them." Id. at 561. For a thoughtful defense of Christian faith as fully compatible with a
pluralistic democratic society, see RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A
DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 160-64 (1996). Yet even Dean Thiemann admits that any
"theoretical defense of public religion will be of little effect unless religious communities
reform their views of faith's contribution to a pluralistic society." Id. at 160.
42. The fourth century marked a bitter war for the "soul" of Rome, even as effective
power passed out of Italy and to Constantinople. A celebrated battle in that war was fought
around the statue of goddess Victory, which the Emperor ordered removed from the alter in
the Senate in order to placate the Christian minority in the Senate. This sparked the famous
exchange between Symmachus, the pagan, and Ambrose, bishop of Milan, around 382.
Symmachus pleaded for toleration and respect for the traditions on which the whole of
Roman civilization was based. Ambrose's response, full of the hubris of a religion on the
ascendant, was ruthless and uncompromising. For a discussion of the debate, see J.M.
WALLACE-HADRILL, THE BARBARIAN WEST A.D. 400- 1000: THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES
10-11 (rev. ed. 1962). The parallels to the "religious" struggle for the "soul" of America
should not be dismissed. The irony is that religious traditionalists occupy the position of
Symmachus in twentieth century America, though they continue to speak the language of
Ambrose.
We can never be certain what was happening. But we can often guess what
contemporaries though was happening. We can see that the material troubles of
their day had sharpened, without creating, their sense of un-ease both with the
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official subjective spiritualisms standing in the place of Religion; rather,
subjective spirituality is now treated like Religion. We are attempting
to change the traditional conceptions of Religion, yet we have not begun
the hard process of reconfiguring the political superstructure that we
built on the basis of the traditional definitions.
The stresses of this dislocation constantly appear in our Religion
Clause cases. The traditionalism of Justice Scalia is a model of political
disestablishment coupled with a fear of subjective spiritualisms:
Values that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
banished from the political process .... But to say that a
nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can
be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.43
Yet, that same political disestablishment would seemingly approve the
use of subjective moral and religious "sensibilities" to disenfranchise
discrete groups of voters.' On the other hand, Justice O'Connor would
have us believe that such subjective spiritualisms, in the form of
religious practices, are entitled to an "affirmative guarantee of the right
to participate in religious activities without impermissible governmental
interference, even where a believer's conduct is in tension with a law of
general application."45 However, such guarantees might not prevent the
government from regulating "licentiousness," which itself is a concept
deeply routed in the moral paradigms of the old Christian legal
classical and with the Christian explanations of man's function in society. Some
contended that Antiquity was passing away; others that it was not; some that
Christianity and classical culture were good bedfellows; others, including some
Christians, that they were not. The history of the times is the fact rather than the
outcome of this deep dispute.
Id. at 20.
43. Department. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990).
44. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See Larry Catd Backer, Reading Entrails:
Romer, VMI, and the Art of Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361, 384-85 (1997).
45. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2185 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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discourse hegemony. '
Such hegemony underlies the Pandora's box which was the now
invalidated RFRA.47 Iranian clerics understood the power of religious
structure well. There is a thin line between the use of religious
sensibilities in forming political decision-making and democratic
theocracy based on absolutist obedience to the interpretive powers of
religious leaders. We ought not to pretend that individual religious
sensibilities can mask the potentially incompatible systems of Religion
for which they are meant to substitute when we think of "religion"
informing "politics." Nor can we fail to remember that, until quite
recently, Religion, or at least the Christian Protestant Religion was
different in this country. Professor Smith's observations about the
fundamental nature of disestablishment at the level of the mundane
cannot be appreciated without an appreciation of the notion of the
special place of Religion in our traditional civil society. It is to this
understanding that I turn to next.
III. RELIGION IS DIFFERENT
Professor Smith makes a strong case for the inclusion of Religion
within legal grammar on the basis of the now increasingly commonly
held notion that Religion is merely different in kind from other forms of
legal grammar. For example, there ought to be no difference in effect
between informing law making by recourse to Religion, and informing
law making by political, ideological or moral systems not labelled
Religion per se. These might well include moral and social philosophy,
economics, critical race or feminist theory, principles of history or any
number of other such referents for valuing choices in law making.Y
Indeed, there is something to be said in favor of the comparability of
Religion to other normative frameworks for decision making in our
society.4
9
46. Id. at 2180.
47. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
48. Thus, for example, Professor Smith notes that Religion is no less widely believed in,
or relevant, or controversial than the non-religious systems of moral philosophy which have
gained currency among the American elite in the last half of this century. See Smith, De
Facto Disestablishment, supra note 3, at 212-13.
49. Thus, some have intimated that comprehensive belief systems may well be
"religions" under any inclusive definition (but without the conventional Godhead). See
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, 1182-83 (2d ed. 1988) ("A
generous functional definition would seem to classify any deep-rooted philosophy as religion,
Marxism as well as Methodism."). Judge Adams has noted that "moral or patriotic views are
not by themselves 'religious,' but if they are pressed as divine law or a part of a
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However, as my discussion in the last section intimated, Religion is
different. Religion, and the Protestant version of this Religion, has had
a critical place in the development of American civil society. To assume
otherwise requires us to forget. It requires us to sanitize Religion of its
history and context. We have fought wars over Religion.50 We still do.5'
We still worry about the "status" of religion-belief system or
nation/state.n We have used Religion as the identifier on the basis of
which we segregate groups within our nation, sometimes by choice,53 and
sometimes not.'" We have used it to establish hierarchy."5 We have
racialized Religion.56 In this we are truly the inheritors of Pagan Rome.'
comprehensive belief system that presents them as 'truth,' they might well rise to the religious
level." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). But see
Choper, supra note 40, at 597-601.
50. For an interesting discussion, see Marvin Becker, An Essay on the Vicissitudes of
Civil Society with Special Reference to Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, 72 IND. L.J. 463
(1997) (discussing the development of the concept of civil society in eighteenth century
Scotland after a long period of civil and religious war).
51. Consider in Europe, the religious disharmony underlying the wars between Irish
Protestants and Catholics. Or, for that matter, between Catholic Croatia, Muslim Bosnia, and
Orthodox Serbia. See generally MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR?
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE (1993) (arguing that current
religious violence evidences the decline of the intellectual hegemony of the Enlightenment
notion of civil society and spawns attempts to reimpose some version of society based on
modem renditions of traditional religious norms); Donald L. Horowitz, Democracy in
Divided Societies, 4(4) J. DEMOCRACY 18 (1993).
52. See Yasmin Abdullah, Note, The Holy See at the United Nations Conferences: State
or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1835 n.3 (1996).
53. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
54. For example, so-called social clubs which restrict membership on the basis of
religious affiliation were common to the American landscape until fairly recently. Secular in
everything but membership criteria, they have been used to exclude and subordinate the
groups deemed unworthy of inclusion. Justice Ginsberg has recounted how, until fairly
recently, it was extremely difficult for a Jewish person to get a job as a lawyer with the large
New York City firms it being expected that Jews would work "with their own." See
ELEANOR H. AYER, RUTH BADER GINSBERG: FIRE AND STEEL ON THE SUPREME COURT
33 (1994).
55. This use of Religion to establish social hierarchy is most evident in the case of
homosexuals. Homosexuals and Jews have been inextricably bound together by a common
core of religious sentiments which have been used to subordinate the one and then the other.
Indeed, as Didi Herman has demonstrated, Religion-or at least the religious sentiments of
certain groups of self-professed Christians-has used the old language of separation and
hierarchy, developed over the centuries to maintain the reduced status of Jews, in the battle
to maintain the social and legal disabilities of gay men and lesbians. See DIDI HERMAN, THE
ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 38-42 (1997).
56. The Spanish were early practitioners of this art and their subjects were the people of
Israel. Consider that the first set of "Jim Crow" laws were developed in Spain in the
sixteenth century and were aimed at excluding newly converted Jews from the economic and
gene pools of the "old" Christians. See, e.g., JANE S. GERBER, THE JEWS OF SPAIN: A
19981
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Each new wave of immigrants has brought to these shores the baggage
of their traditional view of and adherence to Religion and the use of
Religion to define (and oppress) the world from which they came. That
history-Religious culture-does not disappear merely by the expedient
of entry into the United States. However a bloodless discussion of
individualized religious sensibilities would pretend that such things
neither exist nor influence such individual expressions of such "religious
sensibilities."
We still compete fiercely for religious loyalty-and are not above
using the state's instrumentalities to advance the interests of Religion.
This is a world-wide phenomenon. Consider the recent efforts of the
Russian Duma to limit the influx of charismatic Christian sects," the
efforts of the Catholic hierarchy in Spanish-speaking America against
Protestant and Mormon missionaries," or that of Muslim Indonesia to
HISTORY OF THE SEPHARDIC EXPERIENCE 120-124 (The Free Press ed. 1992). The
Germans were the most ferocious practitioners of this sort of sensibility in the twentieth
century. See DANIEL J. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 65-69 (1997). On the creation of the "mythical" Jew in
Anglo-American tradition, see, e.g., BETWEEN "RACE" AND CULTURE: REPRESENTATIONS
OF "THE JEW" IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 1-15 (Bryan Cheyette ed., 1996);
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 10-21 (1996).
57. Consider in this light the contrast between the condition of the Jews and early
Christians in Rome:
The difference between them is simple and obvious, but, according to the sentiments
of antiquity, it was of the highest importance. The Jews were a nation, the
Christians were a sect: and if it was natural for every community to respect the
sacred institutions of their neighbours, it was incumbent on them to persevere in
those of their ancestors.
EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 448 (Harcour Brace,
& Co. 1960) (1737). We have inherited an old tradition indeed.
58. See, e.g., Tom Carter, Yeltsin Blocks Limits on Religious Liberty; U.S. Report Details
Global Persecution, WASH. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at Al. For an interesting perspective, see
Julia Shargorodska, Religious Restrictions Echoed in Other Countries, MOSCOW TIMES, July
25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
59. Indeed, sectarian rivalries reflect more than a struggle for the souls of men; as it has
so often manifested itself over the past several thousand years, such rivalries also seem to
reflect a contest for the control of the mechanisms of political power.
While the conspiracy theories of the left about the evangelicals as agents of
American imperialism are less frequently heard today, the Catholic church
continues to be concerned about the advances of what the Catholic bishops at their
1992 Conference in Santo Domingo called "the sects." Referring to the challenge
posed by "proselytizing fundamentalism by sectarian, Christian groups who hinder
the sound ecumenical path," they accused them of hostility to Catholicism and of
resorting "to defamation and to material inducements," adding that, "although they
are only weakly committed to the temporal realm, they tend to become involved in
politics with a view to taking power."
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pacify Catholic East Timor.6
Our constitution was written at a time in history when the ferocious
use of Religion for this or that political aim was fresh in the minds of the
American post-colonial populace. Consequently, we formalized our
fears about the use of Religion for oppressive purposes by regulating
and limiting the use of Religion for making political and economic
decisions about people.6 ' And yet, the Founding Fathers were only
partially successful. The price (gladly paid) for formal dissociation
between Religion and the state was the retention of the value systems of
the dominant Religion(s) in the civil state. 2 None of this can be easily
brushed aside by the simple expedient of converting Religion into some
sort of individualized set of spirituality. That we would look to
individual expression rather than to the underlying formal web of
conformity and obedience, which constitutes systems of Religion when
we speak about "religion" and its "use" in arriving at political decisions,
does nothing to change the historical character of Religion.
Consider that, until recently, such notions of "individualized
subjective spiritualism" could exist only within the umbrella of
Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights in Latin America, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 173,
179 (1996).
60. See, e.g., Timor Rebels Widen Attacks on Indonesia Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997,
at 17; Ethan Casey, A Nation Out of Control? Indonesia's Christian Minority Faces Beating,
Burnings, and Death, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, March 3,1997, at 50, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
61. Thus, for example, we have prohibited the making of (most) economic or political
decisions based on the religious beliefs of the object of their decision. Justice Scalia's dissent
in Romer v. Evans provides a nice summary of these notions. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, in the style of John Locke, we still permit
making private social decisions on the basis of religious beliefs. We also permit individual
Religions to discriminate against certain forms of social intercourse (ie. marriage outside the
faith, etc.) in the enforcement of its own norms, as long as enforcement is limited. See Locke,
supra note 23.
62. "The reviewed [19th century] commentaries offer explanations why the
constitutional framers avoided an explicit Christian designation, and emphasize the
document's few explicit references to the Deity and implicit incorporation of Christian
customs and belief into constitutional law." Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian
Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on
References to God and the Christian Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L.
REV. 927, 938 (1996) (reviewing earlier commentaries in an attempt to explain the basis for
the lack of explicit references to a Christian deity in the Constitution). Dean Thiemann also
recognizes that at the time the religion clauses appeared to establish diversity, "the de facto
establishment of a cultural Protestant Christianity remained a reality at least until the mid-
twentieth century." Ronald F. Thiemann, Religion and Legal Discourse: An Indirect
Relation, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 287,290 (1998).
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Christianity.6 It existed because the basic acceptable tenets of such
spirituality were firmly grounded in Christian cosmology and moral
philosophy. There was no major rift between basic religious notions, so
understood, and the civil state. We never spoke of it, but why should we
have? "Notions fundamental to the dominant worldview and operation
of a society, precisely because they are taken for granted, often are not
expressed in a manner commensurate with their prominence and
significance or, when uttered, seen as worthy by others to be noted and
recorded."'6 From our perspective at the end of the twentieth century
we cannot see Religion and civil society intimately intertwining. But we
live in an age of competing Religion. In a prior age, the conversation
about Religion and civil society was hardly heard. At the level of
cultural, normative, and political life, Religion (understood as the
Protestant Religion) had completely penetrated law.
Evidence of this union, of this "knowing" in the Biblical sense, is
available at the margins. Consider the regulation of "sodomy."
The early cases speak substantially in religious terms. The
conduct proscribed represents the type of "moral filthiness and
iniquity" which ought to be controlled through the criminal law.
This was a crime committed against the very foundation of the
Christian, and therefore social order, and was of so vile a
magnitude as not to be named by Christians-"Peccatum illud
horrible inter christianos non nominandum." The crime was
considered "one of the most revolting known to the law." It was
as simple as that .... In this sense, the scope of the legal
63. "For much of American history, it was an unchallenged assumption that America
was a 'Christian nation,' not in any particular denominational sense, but more generally as
manifested in traditions,, institutions, values, and symbols." Dreisbach, supra note 62, at 937.
On the history of movements in group expressions of "subjective spiritualism" within
American Christianity, see, e.g., ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA:
PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES (1971); MARTIN E. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS
EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1970); ERNEST L. TUVESON,
REDEEMER NATION: THE IDEA OF AMERICA'S MILLENNIAL ROLE (1968). This notion
changed radically in the second half of the twentieth century, when, in accordance with the
fever dreams of traditionalist advocates, "a distinct minority in America-including extreme
deists, liberal religionists, rationalists, free-thinkers, secularists, agnostics, and hyper-
Calvinists-have maintained that the Constitution's failure to acknowledge God evidenced
an intent by the framers to create a wholly secular polity-one that discontinued all
connection between civil government and religion, or that indicated official indifference or
even hostility toward religion." Dreisbach, supra note 62, at 936. The result is the formal
emergence of non-Western spiritualisms as religion. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a series of city
ordinances substantially prohibiting non-Western religious rituals involving the sacrifice of
animals).
64. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 56, at 32.
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proscription reflected the moral condemnation of the
community. This was thought a sound basis of criminalization,
especially where the moral order was unquestioned.65
Prior to the First World War, then, a consensus appeared to have
been reached by American courts .... This consensus was based
in large part on acceptance of the Christian paradigm of sex and
sexual conduct. There were the two kinds of sex, only one of
which was, within the confines of marriage, licit. All other forms
of sexual conduct were illicit-and an unthinkable violation of
the absolute commandment of God. The "goodness" or
"badness" of particular conduct was judged from the perspective
of Christian sexual taboos-the closer the conduct resembled
"good" sex the less offensive the conduct. Conversely, the less
the conduct proscribed resembled the only form of licit conduct
the more vile was the conduct.'
To courts of an earlier age, there was perhaps only a difference
of degree between the vileness of fellatio and that of, say,
murder. Both amply demonstrated the election of the
perpetrator to ignore as a matter of indifference the moral and
ethical rules of a society based on the marriage relationship
imposed on humankind by God. To a society that unthinkingly
accepts these fundamental norms of social ordering, any activity
in derogation of the family, especially non-marital sexual
activities, is not merely immoral and sinful, but also threatens the
secular order of society, and is therefore a matter of state
regulation. This notion has been reflected from the time of
American independence. Thus, in the guidebook published in
1795 for Virginia justices of the peace, the form to be used for
indictments for buggery declared that the acts giving rise to the
crime resulted from a lack of fear of God, and a disregard for the
order of nature, were instigated by the devil, which greatly
displeased Almighty God, and were against the peace and
dignity of the commonwealth. Good public order, therefore,
seems to require the containment of activity that might have
posed a threat to the state as well as to the divine order 6
"When a conversation is monolithic or close to monolithic on certain
65. Larry Catd Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale About
the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37, 77 (1993)
(citations omitted).
66. Id. at 79.
67. Id. at 80-81.
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points-and this includes the unstated, underlying cognitive models-
then a society's members automatically incorporate its features into the
organization of their minds, into the fundamental axioms that they use
(consciously or unconsciously) in perceiving, understanding, analyzing,
and responding to all social phenomena." ' It was not so long ago, and
consistent with the values we imputed to the First Amendment, that
states could criminalize blasphemy against the Christian sacred. We
still appear to share the same religiously based revulsion about
polygamy,7' though, as traditionalists have pointed out, we have begun
(passively and perhaps blindly) to dismantle legal objections to the
practice.1
When we speak of the use of "religious" values in civil debate, we
forget, at our peril, that to many ears, what is heard is a traditionalist
call, not so much to spirituality and morality, but to the restoration of
Christian moral values hegemony in the civil state.' That baggage is
hard to overcome.73 Religion creates community. The Christian moral
order once created the uncontested basis for law making (and its limits)
68. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 56, at 33-34.
69. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 901, 903 (West 1983) (defining "blasphemy"
as "wantonly uttering or publishing words, casting contumelious reproach or profane ridicule
upon God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Holy Scriptures or the Christian or any other
religion."); See id.. § 903 (declaring blasphemy a misdemeanor). Each of these provisions
were taken from the laws of the Dakota territories.
70. See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); see
also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,569 (1993) (in which Justice
Souter made the suggestion that polygamy could be suppressed as a "substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order" under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
71. "If homosexuality may not be discouraged by state constitutions, it is difficult to see
how the provisions of various state constitutions banning polygamy can stand. They can't as
a logical matter, but the Court (like modern liberal culture) is not as solicitous of polygamy as
it is of homosexuality." BORK, supra note 15, at 113-114.
72. "It was the apparent invasion of the private and sacred zone by forces which
religionists considered alien, subversive or disruptive that occasioned their reactions.
Meanwhile, having yielded so much to secular forces, element after element on the religious
scene found reasons and ways to aspire to recover some vision of the whole, some means to
address all of life." Martin E. Marty, The Twentieth Century: Protestants and Others, in
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980S
322,334 (Mark A. Noll ed. 1990).
73. "For good or ill, Biblical foundationalism has shaped our social ordering in ways in
which the merely political or economic cannot fundamentally change." Larry Cati Backer,
The Many Faces of Hegemony: Patriarchy and Welfare as a Women's Issue, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 54, on file with the author) (reviewing MIMI
ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK, FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1996)).
RELIGION AND THE GRAMMAR OF LAW
in this society. Christianity provided what Professor Fish might describe
as our foundationalist basis for law. 4 Consequently, I do not believe
one can divorce Religion from the context in which it has existed in the
world. Religion is not merely a series of conduct codes and precepts.
Religion is not merely a moral philosophy, nor a naked spirituality. It is
a world view, which necessarily incorporates judgments about others,
and particularly other religions, as well as a sense of its relationships
with those not of that particular religious community.
Understand that the sanitizing which I describe is not limited to
Western European religious history and context. Islam provides its own
sets of oppressions, no less nasty than anything coming out of Europe.
Consider the situation of the Coptic Christians in Egypt,75 or the Ba'hais
in Iran 6 Asia provides its own context with, for example, the recent
efforts of the People's Republic of China to suppress Christianity.' One
could go on and on. But this suffices to make the point. Even if we are
prepared to concede that religion can exist as a collection of subjective
spirituality, it is hard to apply Religion as the grammar of law shorn of
the history and context of the religious values thus infusing the debate.
IV. IF RELIGION FORMS THE GRAMMAR OF LAW, Do WE ABANDON
ASSIMILATION AS A FORCE IN AMERICAN LIFE
Religion, therefore, can be dangerous as a source of the grammar of
law today, as merely another moral or ethical component of legal
decision making.' I do not speak to the value of religious community or
to the utility of fostering such communities of believers. However, when
applied as the grammar of the law of the American community, I believe
74. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Is there a Text in this Class?, in IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? 303-04 (1980).
75. A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind: The Well Poisoners, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1997, at
A23.
76. See Sajid Rizvi, Dateline: The Third World Iran's Mullahs Wage War on Bahai Faith,
UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 18, 1983, available in LEXIS, News Libraries, Arcnws Lib.
(Reporting that "[t]he Bahais have faced harassment in Iran... since the birth of the religion
in the 1840s.").
77. See, e.g., Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Cites Foreign Foes of Christianity: China, Saudi
Arabia Top State Dept List, WASH. POST, July 23, 1997, at A18; Frank Langfitt, "We Will
Not Stop" Dissident Pastor Says; China "Underground" Churches Continue to Grow Despite
the State's Attempt to Control Them, BALTIMORE SUN, July 24, 1997 at 1A, available in,
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
78. Again, this is not to imply that other normative structures are any less dangerous.
Marxism, for example, may be as dangerous as Religion when it serves as a basis for law's
grammar.
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it threatens that other great American project-assimilation. The
danger does not arise because Religion is illogical or "bad" in itself.
Instead, the danger lies in the power of Religion to exclude. Were this
merely a theoretical danger, perhaps it would not be so great. However,
Religion, unsanitized of its history and context, provides a powerful site
for exclusion, racialization, and anti-pluralism. Religion comes with too
much baggage; it is imperialist and uncompromising; it is conversation
ending.
In a society which makes the basic decision to accept as binding the
fundamental norms animating a Religion, such a Religion is
unproblematic. In such a society, Religion serves its naturaf role as
supplier of the foundation of politics, society and culture-as providing
the language of discussion and the limits of thought. Disagreement in
such a society occurs at the margin and involves small questions of
hermeneutics within a well defined moral-political world. Toleration is
permitted for social and religious characteristics which are not too
dissimilar from the fundamental Religion.79 That, indeed, might well
have characterized the basic agreement of this nation prior to the
Second World War.'°
Sometime thereafter, our elites decided, with the acquiescence of
some but by no means all, of the rest of us, that in a pluralist society,
these characteristics are potentially dangerous to a free people.
Formally divorcing official Religion from law permits the development
of a unifying language of law and social discourse shorn of the divisive
effects of differences in dogma in an America in which differences in
religious dogma, and its effects on fundamental approaches to law
making, have been magnified.
The question thus arises, in contesting the traditional binding of civil
norm to Religious value, have we chosen to substitute a different sort of
faith for that we seemingly abandon, or have we chosen merely to better
camouflage the religious sentiment underlying our law making?81 One
79. "[T]oleration need not be an infinitely elastic principle and tends to cluster around a
norm. The norm itself assumes critical importance as the referent for determining whether
and to what extent a given form of expression is to be suppressed." Larry Catd Backer,
Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of Private Sexual Conduct, the
Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REV. 755,772 (1993).
80. See generally MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM IN THE UNITED STATES:
RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE (2d ed. 1986). But see generally ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE
MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996).
81. Thus, for example, in The Godless Constitution, not only do the authors attempt to
refute the current conservative Christian arguments that the Founding Fathers intended to
establish some sort of Christian nation, but they make the further argument that a secular
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can argue that the irresistible force of faith sustains the drive to this
modem form of assimilation of and conformity by the not yet saved. "If
you believe you are saved, you can easily come to believe that you can
do no wrong. Because you believe in God, you will believe you are
God, or at least that you're in tight with Him."'  The critical change,
however, lies in the fact that Religion no longer occupies an exclusive
position as the source of legal rationale. It must share this role with
potentially competing systems. To the extent other voices win,
assimilation through norm imposition finds a basis in which the old
exclusions of Religion can be avoided.
McGowen v. Maryland" provides the classic example of this
substitution syndrome. As long as we are able to supply rationales not
explicitly "religious" then even the "religious" can pass muster under
our basic law. This arguably sophistic transformation is quite explicit in
the American approach to "welfare reform."
Our species of late-twentieth-century welfare foundationalism is
little more than a secularized Christian aesthetics of a proper
world order's care and maintenance .... [T]he fundamental
substructure animating poor relief has not changed since the
fourth century. The basic framework of our thinking about
poverty is as old as our Anglo-European culture's dominant
religion. It was first shaped by the early Fathers of the Roman
Catholic Church and adopted by their Protestant heirs. Its basis
is the direct, immutable, and unavoidable command of God.
Religious teaching mirrors the civil notion of the destitute social
maladjustment. What emerges is a reminder that God has not
lifted the command to be self-sufficient, first delivered at the
time of the expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Sloth is still sin;
the taking of alms when one can work is theft from the giver as
well as from the deserving who would then have to make do
without and therefore a double sin. Children born out of
wedlock are illegitimate, and that illegitimacy means something
quite real and concrete. Poverty is a sign of sin, to be remedied
nation, free of religious sensibilities was what they intended. See KRAMNICK & MOORE,
supra note 80, at 23-24.
82. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84
CAL. L. REV. 61, 78 (1996). And yet, Professor Delgado would limit the application of its
principles to dominant group culture-no others suffer this infection. I am not convinced this
is so, especially given the (for example) vibrant separatist traditions of African-Americans in
this country.
83. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Court expressed the view that the "Establishment Clause
does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." Id. at 442.
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by greater devotion to religious teaching and greater application
to work .... [T]he modern manifestation of these teachings is as
religiously neutered as our own public culture, they have found
their way into the core of our economic conception of the ideal
society, a society peopled by the self-sufficient. Our notion of a
pauper's place in our social order has become enshrined in our
social sciences as well.'"
Yet, I would argue that substitution has had significant effort on the
way we understand our normative roots. We speak the unifying
language of fairness in law making in the late twentieth century and not
the language of Religion. This is the age of due process. The language
of fairness provides the unifying glue to our law making, formerly
exercised by Religion, irrespective of the similarity of result to that
which might have been determined through the application of
traditional religious value. To the extent that explicit resort to religious
sensibilities may fit within this structure, there may well be a place for it
within the new assimilative model into which we have drifted.
Still, this is a perverse, or rather, a "modern" view of assimilation
and its relationship to religion. Until fairly recently, I have argued
above,8 the great imperatives of assimilation and that of the Christian
Religion 6 were practically two different ways of describing the same
thing. The decision to treat Religion primarily as an object of law is thus
an important assimilative discipline. Indeed, e pluribus unum assumes a
role of civil antipode to the assimilative potential of majoritarian
religions. The mix becomes murkier when one throws into this stew the
historical reality that until very recently, it was a subconscious
commonplace to speak the language of mainline Protestant religious
sensibilities in law making, and thus treat Religion, in its formal
manifestations, as object. But we have crossed the Rubicon-we have
attempted to distance our law making from its religiously based
normative roots. The reintroduction of those ancient roots suggests an
84. Larry CatA Backer, Poor Relief, Welfare Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 34-35 (citations omitted).
85. See supra notes 41-42.
86. Again, I use this phrase deliberately and ambiguously. In the West, the Christian
religion might at times have been understood to exclude either Catholics or Protestants,
depending on the perspective of the speaker. When used in relationship to non-Christian
religions, the term might unite Catholics and Protestants (though not necessarily always).
Also in the West, Eastern Christians have almost automatically been excluded-either on the
grounds of heresy or exoticness-since the eleventh century era. My sense is that it has been
used more frequently in its widest meaning as the number of Catholics in the United States
has grown in this century.
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overturning of the post-war liberal consensus of law making. Or it
suggests the imposition of some newer version of religious orthodoxy in
an age of more militantly clashing orthodoxies.
There is, as I have suggested, a very fine line between using Religion
as a tool for legal discourse and re-converting legal discourse into
Religious discourse. It is a line which our Founding Fathers had no
reason to think about because they were all parties to the general
consensus of Christian values guiding law making in the first two
centuries of our independent existence. With the loss of that consensus,
the disestablishment of religious discourse even at the level of mundane
law making becomes plainly obvious, as Professor Smith suggests. Its
reintroduction becomes painfully more dangerous as well as we struggle
for a new basis of consensus on which the peoples of America choose to
join.8
What remains is a kind of dialogue based on mutual non-
recognition. This is a dialogue which breeds subordination as
groups apply the normative principles of conformity and
assimilation to as large a group of people as possible. Social
cohesion, the discipline of the group in the face of mutual
incompatibility, requires choice. From the perspective of the
dominant group, subordination means reducing contrary cultural
norms to a silence in the public (though not the private) space.
Polyculturalism can exist in theory-in reality it describes a
transitional period between the dominance of one set of socio-
cultural norms and another. A set of norms must govern, and yet
all norms are subordinating of those who are defined as
outsiders-and every group has its outsiders.'
What we have left, then, is an assimilation imperative shorn of its
roots in Religion, but in which Religion(s), along with a host of other
voices, vie for norm-setting dominance. Each community of norm-
setters, within the context of the current language of fairness, hears all
others as the strident attempts by other groups to impose its norms on
the others-norms which will subordinate and exclude in ways different
from that of the current norms, but exclude and subordinate
nonetheless. For traditionalists, Professor Smith's article uncovers the
truly tragic: Explicitly religious sentiments have been transformed from
87. For interesting searches for other bases for civic assimilation, see generally MARTIN
E. MARTY, THE ONE AND THE MANY: AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE COMMON GOOD
(1997); GLAZER, supra note 14.
88. Larry Catd Backer, By Hook or by Crook: Conformity, Assimilation and Liberal
and Conservative Poor Relief Theory, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 391, 439 (1996).
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the ever-present subconscious arbiter of legal normativity, to just
another voice vying to be heard among the cacophony of systems
seeking norm-setting dominance in our nation.
V. CONCLUSION
I end, where I began, with the perceptive questions Professor Smith
raised. Religion has certainly been deprivileged. Disestablishment
exists now in the very heart of places once almost exclusively reserved
to it in law making. But we are stuck on the horns of a dilemma of our
own creation. We conceived of the separation of Church and State, of
the treatment of formal Religion and its values as res at a time when
religious consensus made these religious sentiments an unconscious and
almost inextricable part of the legal dialogue. We have entered an age
when this unconscious acceptance of underlying religious Christian
norms is contested. Indeed, since McGowen v. Maryland, courts have
become publicly scared of it. Yet, the unconscious acceptance of
fundamentally Christian norms as the basis for law making remains
powerful in this society. It is merely contested in ways that were
unheard of fifty years ago and eroded in some areas of law making. It
remains to be seen whether dialogue over law making must now make
room for what had once been a dominant norm-setting voice as yet
another and perhaps important voice in law making, even at the level of
the mundane. I suggest that this is a dangerous enterprise. "As long as
the 'myth of absoluteness' dominates the self understanding of religious
communities, they cannot be confident participants in a pluralistic
society.' ' 9
89. THIEMANN, supra note 41, at 161.
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